


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DIA and DOS have no objection
to declassification and release.

9 September 1959

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

9 September 1959

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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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OK Laos: (Laotian intelligence officials admit ignorance of the present military situation in Sam Neua Province, stating they have no recent messages from the field.) High-ranking military representatives from Argentina, Italy, Japan, and Tunisia, members of the UN Security Council's subcommittee on Laos, are expected to leave later this week for Vientiane. The group has no authority to make recommendations but will report its findings to the council as soon as possible. The Communist bloc continues to denounce the prospect of UN action on the Laotian question. Peiping and Hanoi have termed it "illegal" and a pretext for American intervention. (Page 1)

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DAILY BRIEF

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India: (The Indian Communist party, suffering serious political reverses as a result of the recent Sino-Indian border friction, has reportedly ordered its general secretary, Ajoy Ghosh, to review the situation with Chinese leaders. Ghosh, now in Moscow discussing domestic party matters and scheduled to visit Peiping, is to inform the Chinese of the difficulties their actions have created for the Indian Communist party. The Indian party has felt compelled to issue a statement deploring the recent border clashes, stating that Indian territorial integrity must be safeguarded, and hoping that matters can be solved by negotiation. The Indian Communist party is also plagued by continuing dissension over the question of retaining its reliance on parliamentary tactics instead of adopting "revolutionary" methods.)

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CENTO (Baghdad Pact): (Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey are apparently planning a concerted effort to obtain US adherence to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), formerly the Baghdad Pact. They are holding a series of preliminary talks and probably intend to raise the question as a key issue at the Washington meeting of the CENTO ministerial council in October. London, meanwhile, does not appear ready to increase its own modest material support for CENTO, and a Foreign Office official recently expressed fear that Iran might go neutralist if the Shah does not receive the aid he feels necessary.)

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III. THE WEST

Cuba: (Fidel Castro indicated to US Ambassador Bonsal on 3 September that his government plans a review of American private interests in Cuba, with emphasis on those which obtained their concessions under Batista, and that he is determined to continue action against many of them. Castro and Foreign Minister Roa both indicated that they will press demands for massive US economic aid to Cuba and Latin America.)

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Situation in Laos

(There continue to be conflicting reports from Laos on the status and location of the main Communist forces which may pose a threat to the town of Sam Neua. The Laotian army G-2 admitted to the American army attaché on 7 September that he had had no specific information on the situation in Sam Neua Province for two days. In speculating that some enemy forces may have withdrawn to North Vietnam, he emphasized that this was merely a possibility and remained unconfirmed. He said that he had ordered patrols out in an effort to determine the true situation.)

(Meanwhile, fresh Communist troops of about battalion size have been identified in southeastern Phong Saly Province, according to General Ouane, the Laotian Army chief of staff. Such an augmentation of Communist strength would further complicate the defensive problems of the already overtaxed Laotian Army.)

High-ranking military representatives from Argentina, Italy, Japan, and Tunisia are expected to leave later this week for Vientiane, under UN Security Council auspices. As many as 15 men from each country may eventually make up the group because of the difficult terrain in Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces which must be observed. The group has no authority to make recommendations but will merely report its findings to the council "as soon as possible."

A possible new line in North Vietnam's propaganda appeared on 8 September when Hanoi publicized an alleged Neo Lao Hak Zat statement which asserted that the only solution to the Laotian problem was negotiation between the two parties concerned--the Royal Government and the Pathet Lao forces. Heretofore, bloc propaganda has proposed revival of the ICC in Laos and strict observance of the Geneva and Vientiane agreements as the "only" solution to the situation. The new willingness to negotiate on the part of the NLHZ may reflect confidence that the rebellion has achieved sufficient success to provide a basis for negotiation.

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Indian Communist Party Consults Moscow and Peiping
On Friction Between India and China

(The dilemma in which the Indian Communist party (CPI) has been placed by the recent friction between India and Communist China over border problems is emphasized by its order to party secretary Ajoy Ghosh to review the situation in talks with Chinese as well as Soviet leaders.)

(Ghosh left for Moscow on 26 August under CPI instructions to inform Khrushchev of the embarrassing position in which Indian Communists find themselves as a result of recent Chinese action toward India. Ghosh was to point out that CPI sympathizers in India were turning anti-Chinese and the party was being isolated because of its inability either to join in the criticism of Peiping or to come out in open support of the Chinese. The CPI, in these circumstances, requested the "advice" of the Soviet party on what stand it should take.)

(In a subsequent letter to Ghosh in Moscow, the CPI executive reportedly directed him to discuss these difficulties with top Chinese Communist leaders during his scheduled visit to Peiping. The CPI had already sent a formal letter in mid-August to the Chinese Communist party explaining its position and recommending that Peiping confine its use of such terms as "Indian expansionists" in propaganda material to specific anti-Communist elements in India.)

(Ghosh is not likely to find the Chinese sympathetic to the CPI's plight. Chinese diplomatic officials in India reportedly have criticized Indian Communists for bungling the situation in Kerala and also questioned the CPI's public statement welcoming the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting. The Chinese leaders with whom Ghosh talks probably will insist that Peiping has no choice but to defend what it claims as Chinese territory. They will almost certainly suggest that the CPI support Peiping's formal position favoring "peaceful negotiations" on border problems.)

(In addition to discussing the border situation, Ghosh was empowered to convey to Moscow the "true facts" behind New Delhi's)

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(intervention in Kerala State. The CPI apparently wanted to be certain that there was "no misunderstanding"--particularly in Khrushchev's mind--about Nehru's being personally responsible for the Communist government's dismissal. In this connection, Ghosh was to recommend that the present level of Soviet aid to India not be increased; that Moscow should stop and study the "rightist" trend thoroughly. This line reflects the view privately held by some Indian Communist leaders that Soviet aid to Nehru's Congress party government undercuts Communist objectives in India.) [REDACTED]

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III. THE WEST

Castro Discussion With US Ambassador

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(Fidel Castro indicated to US Ambassador Bonsal on 3 September that his government plans a review of American private interests in Cuba and that he is determined to take action against many of them. During the discussion Castro mentioned companies which received concessions from the Batista government, referring specifically to the contract with the Cuban American Nickel Company at Moa Bay, which he said had been opposed by the Cuban National Economic Council. Moa Bay, where production is just getting under way, is expected to become Cuba's largest nickel producer and has a guaranteed market in the United States until 1965.)

(Ambassador Bonsal does not believe Castro plans to handle these matters personally. They will probably be the responsibility of a new agency or ministry which will reportedly be established with complete control over industries and the revolutionary government's plans for industrialization. It apparently will be headed by Major Ernesto Guevara, who returned on 7 September from a successful three-month "good will" mission to Asia and Africa. The bitterly anti-US Guevara is a close associate of Castro. His statements and actions in the past have significantly furthered Communist objectives in Cuba.)

(Castro may be planning to request a substantial public loan from the US. Both he and Foreign Minister Roa stressed to Ambassador Bonsal the need for massive US economic assistance for industrialization in Cuba and in Latin America.)

(In political as well as economic matters Castro seemed completely preoccupied with the details of agrarian reform and military activities. His belief that his economic and social theories are superior to either capitalism or Communism has evidently convinced him that the East-West struggle is not his concern. He accepts support of local Communists because it helps him politically and in labor circles.)

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The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

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Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
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Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
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